The value of a firms securities measures the value of the firms productive assets. If the assets include only capital goods and not a permanent monopoly franchise, the value of the securities measures the value of the capital. Finally, if the price of the capital can be measured or inferred, the quantity of the firms capital is the value divided by the price. A standard model of adjustment costs enables the inference of the price of installed capital. I explore the implications of the proposition using data from U.S. non-farm, non-financial corporations over the past 50 years. The data imply that corporations have formed large amounts of intangible capital, especially in the past decade. The resources for expanding capital have come from the output of the existing capital. An endogenous growth model can explain the basic facts about corporate performance, with a substantial but not implausible increase in the productivity of capital in the 1990s.
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I. Introduction
Securities marketsprimarily the stock marketmeasure the value of a firms capital stock. The value is the product of the price of installed capital and the quantity of capital. This paper is about inferring the quantity of capital and therefore the amount of capital accumulation from the observed values of securities. In the simplest case, without adjustment costs, the price of capital is observed in capital goods markets and is also the price of installed capital. The quantity of capital is the value observed in the stock market divided by the price.
More generally, in the presence of convex adjustment costs, the observed value of capital is the product of the shadow value of installed capital and the quantity of capital. The shadow value can be inferred from the marginal adjustment cost schedule. Then the quantity of capital is the value of capital divided by the shadow value of capital.
The method developed in this paper provides a way to measure intangible capital accumulated by corporations, where both the flow of investment and the stock of capital are not directly observed. There are good reasons to believe that otherwise unmeasurable intangible capital is an important part of the capital of a modern economy.
Three key assumptions underlie the method developed here. First, product markets are competitive, in the sense that firms do not earn any pure profits in the long run. Otherwise, the value of a monopoly franchise would be confused with the quantity of capital. Second, production takes place with constant returns to scale. Firms do not earn Ricardian rents. Third, all factors owned by the firm can be adjusted fully in the long run. Firms purchase factors at known prices, which, in the longer run, are equal to the internal shadow prices of those factors. In the longer run, capital earns no rent because it is in perfectly elastic supply to the firm. I call this the zero-rent economy. The idea that securities values reveal the quantity of capital in the absence of rents was stated clearly by Baily [1981] in the context of the events of the 1970s.
The zero-rent economy is the polar opposite of the endowment economy where the quantity of capital and its returns are exogenous. Claims on endowments are valued in the stock market according to principles set forth in Lucas [1978] . There is no investment in the endowment economy. The quantity of capital is exogenous and its price is endogenous. The price of capital is determined entirely by the rent that capital earns. By contrast, in the zero-rent economy, firms purchase newly produced physical capital whenever such a purchase generates an expected gain, with suitable discounting for risk.
This paper interprets data from the U.S. non-farm, non-financial corporate sector within the zero-rent framework. I calculate the quantity of capital from the observed value of corporate securities. I also calculate the product of capital, the amount of output produced each year by a unit of capital. The output includes the capital produced as well as the observed output. Over a broad range of adjustment costs, the movements of the implied quantity of the capital stock in the U.S. nonfarm, non-financial corporate sector are similar. Two features stand out in all of my calculations: First, capital accumulation was rapid and the productivity of capital was high in the 1950s and 1960s, and again in the 1980s and 1990s. Second, either the capital stock or its price fell dramatically in 1973 and 1974. This paper is not a contribution to financial valuation analysisit adopts standard modern finance theory as given. Nonetheless, I will examine the data used in this paper within finance theory. If there were anomalies in the valuation of corporate securities, they would cause anomalies in the measurement of produced capital, within the measurement framework developed here.
The data suggest that U.S. corporations own substantial amounts of intangible capital not recorded in the sectors books or anywhere in government 3 statistics. There is a large discrepancy between the market value of corporate assets and the purchase or reproduction cost of recorded produced capital. This point is well known from research in the framework of Tobins q. When securities markets record an increase in the firms quantity of capital greater than its observed investment, the inference in the zero-rent framework is that the firm has produced and accumulated the additional capital. The extra production is not included in accounting records of returns.
Cochrane [1991 and 1996] measures the return to physical capital as its marginal product within a parametric production function, rather than as a residual. If intangible capital is an important factor of production, the marginal product of physical capital will depend on the quantity of intangible capital.
Hence, within the framework of this paper, Cochranes test for physical capital is contaminated because it ignores intangible capital. And the data are completely absent for extending Cochranes strategy to intangible capital or total capital.
A number of recent papers have studied the theory of the stock market in an economy with production (for example, Naik [1994] , Kogan [1999] , and Singal and Smith [1999] ). The theory paper closest to my empirical work is Abel [1999] .
That paper demonstrates that random influencessuch as an unexpected increase in the birth ratewill raise the price of installed capital temporarily in an economy with convex adjustment costs for investment. Abels intergenerational model assumes, implicitly, that adjustment costs impede adjustment from one generation to the next. I believe that this characterization of the effect of adjustment costs is implausible. I believe that a reasonable rate of adjustment is around 50 percent per year, though I also present results for a much lower rate of 10 percent per year. Neither rate would permit much fluctuation in the price of capital from one generation to the next.
The primary goal of this paper is to pursue the hypothesis that securities markets record the quantity of produced capital accumulated by corporations.
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Although this view is particularly interesting with respect to huge increases in stock-market values that have occurred over the past five years, this paper has ambitions beyond an attempt to explain recent events. Rather, I look at data over the entire postwar period. I concentrate not on the stock market, but on the combined value of equity and debt. The view that emerges from my review of the data is the following, based on averages from 1945 to 1998. Firms produce productive capital by combining plant, equipment, new ideas, and organization.
The average annual net marginal product of capital is 8.4 percent. That is, a unit of capital produces 0.084 units of output beyond what is needed to exchange for labor and other inputs, including adjustment costs, and to replace worn capital.
Corporations divide this bonus between accumulating more capital at a rate of 6.4 percent per year and paying their owners 2.0 percent of the current value of the capital.
At the beginning of 1946, non-farm, non-financial corporations had capital worth $645 billion 1996 dollars. Shareholders and debt holders have been drawing out of this capital at an average rate of 2.0 percent per year. The power of compounding is awesomethe $645 billion nest egg became $13.9 trillion by the middle of 1999, despite invasion by shareholders and debt holders in most years. An endogenous growth model, applied to corporations rather than the entire economy, describes the evolution of the capital stock. Spectacular increases in stock-market/capital values in 1994-1999 are associated with high values of the product of capital. The average for the 1990s of 17 percent compares to 9 percent in another period of growth and prosperity, the 1950s. In the 1970s, the figure fell to 0.5 percent. I discuss some evidence linking the higher product of capital in the 1990s to information technology.
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II. Inferring the Quantity of Capital from Securities Values
A. Theory
Define the following notation: profit less investment and adjustment costs to its shareholders, in the amount:
The value of the firm is the present value of the future payouts:
The capital stock evolves according to:
Let t q be the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint (2.3); it is the shadow price of installed capital. Necessary conditions for the maximization of the value of the firm with respect to the investment decision made at the beginning of period t are (see, for example, Abel [1990] Measuring the quantity of capital is particularly simple when there are no adjustment costs. In that case, the marginal adjustment cost schedule in Figure 1 is flat at zero, and the quantity of capital is the value of the firm stated in units of capital goods. Baily [1981] developed the quantity revelation theorem for the case of no adjustment costs.
B. Interpretation
It is always true that the value of the firm equals the value of its capital stock, assuming that ownership of the capital stock is equivalent to ownership of the firm. But only under limited conditions does the value of the capital stock reveal the quantity of capital. These conditions are the absence of monopoly or Ricardian rents that would otherwise be capitalized in the firms value. In addition, there must be only a single kind of capital with a measured acquisition price (here taken to be one). Capital could be non-produced, such as land, provided that it is the only type of capital and its acquisition price is measured.
Similarly, capital could be intellectual property, with the same provisions.
As a practical matter, firms have more than one kind of capital and the acquisition price of capital is not observed with much accuracy. The procedure is only an approximation in practice. I believe it is an interesting approximation because the primary type of capital with an acquisition price that is not pinned down on the production side is land, and land is not an important input to the non-farm corporate sector. For intellectual property and other intangibles, there is no reason to believe that there are large discrepancies between its acquisition price and the acquisition price of physical capital. Both are made primarily from labor.
It is key to understand that it is the acquisition pricethe cost of producing new intellectual propertyand not the market value of existing intellectual property that is at issue here.
Intellectual property may be protected in various waysby patents, copyrights, or as trade secrets. During the period of protection, the property will earn rents and may have value above its acquisition cost. The role of the adjustment cost specification, then, is to describe the longevity of protection.
Rivals incur adjustment costs as they develop alternatives that erode the rents without violating the legal protection of the intellectual property. When the protection endsas when a patent expiresother firms compete away the rents by the creation of similar intellectual property. The adjustment cost model is a reasonable description of this process. When applying the model to the case of intellectual property, the specification of adjustment costs should be calibrated to
be consistent with what is known about the rate of erosion of intellectual property rents.
The adjustment cost function
is not required to be symmetric.
Thus the approach developed here is consistent with irreversibility of investment.
If the marginal adjustment cost for reductions in the capital stock is high in relation to the marginal cost for increases, as it would be in the case of irreversible investment, then the procedure will identify decreases in value as decreases in the price of capital, while it will identify increases in value as mostly increases in the quantity of capital. The specification adopted later in this paper has that property.
The key factor that underlies the quantity revelation theorem is that marketsin the process of discounting the cash flows of corporationsanticipate that market forces will eliminate pure rents from the return to capital. Hall [1977] used this principle to unify the seeming contradiction between the project evaluation approach to investmentwhere firms invest in every project that meets a discounted cash flow criterion that looks deeply into the futureand neoclassical investment theorywhere firms are completely myopic and equate the marginal product of capital to its rental price. The two principles are identical when the projection of cash flows anticipates that the neoclassical first-order condition will hold at all times in the future. The formalization of q theory by Abel [1979] , Hayashi [1982] , and others generalized this view by allowing for delays in the realization of the neoclassical condition.
Much of the increase in the market values of firms in the past decade appears to be related to the development of successful differentiated products, protected to some extent from competition by intellectual property rights relating to technology and brand names. I have suggested above that the framework of this paper is a useful approximation for studying intellectual property along with physical capital. It is an interesting questionnot to be pursued in this paper whether there is a concept of capital for which a more general version of the quantity revelation theorem would apply. In the more general version, monopolistic competition would replace perfect competition.
III. Data
This paper rests on a novel accounting framework, suited to studying the The sum of the four categories is cash paid out to the owners of corporations. A key feature of the accounting system is that this flow of cash is exactly the cash generated by the operations of the firmit is revenue less cash outlays including purchases of capital goods. There is no place that a firm can park cash or obtain cash that is not included in the cash flows listed here.
The flow of cash to owners differs from the return earned by owners because of revaluations. The total return comprises cash received plus capital gains.
I take data from the flow of funds accounts maintained by the Federal Reserve Board. 14,000
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Figure 2. Value of the Securities of Non-Farm, Non-Financial Corporations in Billions of 1996 Dollars
Nominal value divided by the implicit deflator for private fixed nonresidential investment
In 1986, the real value of the sectors securities was about the same as in 1968. By 1999, it had more than tripled its 1990 level. As Figure 3 shows, the sector began and ended the period without little debt in relation to equity. But debt was 35 percent of the total value of securities at its peak in 1982. Again, I
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Figure 6. Payout Yield (Ratio of Payout to Value of Securities)
The upper line is the total payout to equity and debt holders and the lower line is the payout to debt holders only, as a ratio to the total value of securities.
Although the payout yield fell to a low level by 1999, the high average level of the yield through the 1990s should be compared to the extraordinarily low level of the dividend yield in the stock market, the basis for some concerns that the stock market is grossly overvalued. As the data in Figure 4 show, dividends are only a fraction of the story of the value earned by shareholders. In particular, when corporations pay off large amounts of debt, there is a benefit to shareholders equal to the direct receipt of the same amount of cash. Concentration on dividends, or even dividends plus share repurchases, gives a seriously incomplete picture of the buildup of shareholder value. It appears that the finding of Campbell and Shiller [1998] that the dividend yield of stocks has dropped far below its historical levelhas the neutral explanation that dividends have declined as a method of payout, rather than the exciting conclusion that the value of the stock market is too high to be sustained. Fama and French [1998] 
IV. Valuation
The foundation of valuation theory is that the market value of securities measures the present value of future payouts. To the extent that this proposition fails, the approach in this paper will mis-measure the quantity of capital. It is useful to check the valuation relationship over the sample period to see if it performs suspiciously. Many commentators are quick to declare departures from rational valuation when the stock market moves dramatically, as it has over the past few years.
Some reported data related to valuation move smoothly, particularly dividends. Consequently, economistsnotably Robert Shiller [1989] have suggested that the volatility of stock prices is a puzzle given the stability of dividends. The data discussed earlier in this paper show that the stability of 19 dividends is an illusion. Securities markets should discount the cash payouts to securities owners, not just dividends. For example, the market value of a flow of dividends is lower if corporations are borrowing to pay the dividends. Figure 5 shows how volatile payouts have been throughout the postwar period. As a result, rational valuations should contain substantial noise. The risk premium φ is identified by this condition as the mean of 1
The estimate of the risk premium φ is 0.077 with a standard error of 0.020.
This should be interpreted as the risk premium for real corporate assets, related to
what is called the asset beta in the standard capital asset pricing model. 1 9 4 6 1 9 4 8 1 9 5 0 1 9 5 2 1 9 5 5 1 9 5 7 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 1 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 7 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 I see nothing in the data to suggest any systematic failure of the standard valuation principlethat the value of the stock market is the present value of future cash payouts to shareholders. Moreover, the recent surge in the stock marketthough not completely explained by the corresponding behavior of payoutsis within the normal amount of noise in valuations. The valuation equation is symmetric between the risk-free interest rate and the return to corporate securities. To the extent that there is a mystery about the behavior of financial markets in recent years, it is either that the interest rate has been too low or the return to securities too high. The average valuation residual in Figure 7 for 1994 through 1999 is 7.7 percent at annual rates, with a standard error of 3.7 percent. Though this is a 2-sigma event, it should not be considered unusual, in view of the fact that the period over which it is estimated was chosen after seeing the data.
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V. The Quantity of Capital
To apply the method developed in this paper, I need evidence on the adjustment cost function. I take its functional form to be piecewise quadratic: For simplicity, I will assume for this analysis that discounting can be expressed by a constant discount factor, β . Then the first equation of the dynamical system equates the marginal product of installed capital to the service price:
The second equation equates the marginal adjustment cost to the shadow value of capital less its acquisition cost of 1: The calibration for places the elasticity of the return to capital in the non-farm, non-financial corporate sector at half the level of the elasticity in an economy with a Cobb-Douglas technology and a labor share of 0.7. The adjustment speed is chosen to make the average lag in investment be two years, in line with results reported by Shapiro [1986] . The intercept of the marginal product of capital is chosen to normalize the steady-state capital stock at 1, without loss of generality. The resulting value of the adjustment coefficient, α , from equation 14,000 1 9 4 6 1 9 4 8 1 9 5 0 1 9 5 2 1 9 5 4 1 9 5 6 1 9 5 8 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 0.000 Hamermesh and Pfann [1996] survey the literature on adjustment costs with the general conclusion that adjustment speeds are lower then Shapiros estimates. 
VI. The Capital Accumulation Model
. This can also be written as
Note that this is the one-period return from holding a stock whose price is k and whose dividend is d .
The productivity measure adds increases in the market value of corporations to their payouts to measure output. The noise in Figures 
VII. The Nature of Accumulated Capital
The concept of capital relevant for this discussion is not just plant and equipment. It is well known from decades of research in the framework of Tobins q that the ratio of the value of total corporate securities to the reproduction cost of the corresponding plant and equipment varies over a range from well under one (in the period from 1974 to 1982) to well above one (in the 1960s and 1990s). A concept of intangible capital is essential to the idea that the stock market measures the quantity of capital. In addition, the view needs to include capital disasters of the type that seems to have occurred in 1974. The relevant concept of reproduction cost is subtler than a moving average of past measured investments.
Firms own produced capital in the form of plant, equipment, and intangibles such as intellectual property. Hall [1999] suggests that firms also have organizational capital resulting from the resources they deployed earlier to recruit the people and other inputs that constitute the firm. Research in the framework of Tobins q has confirmed that the categories other than plant and equipment must be important. In addition, the research has shown that the market value of the firm or of the corporate sector may drop below the reproduction cost of just its plant and equipment, when the stock is measured as a plausible weighted average of past investment. That is, the theory has to accommodate the possibility that an event may effectively disable an important fraction of existing capital. Otherwise, it would be paradoxical to find that the market value of a firms securities is less than the value of its plant and equipment.
Tobins q is the ratio of the value of a firm or sectors securities to the estimated reproduction cost of its plant and equipment. 3.500 1 9 4 6 1 9 4 8 1 9 5 1 1 9 5 4 1 9 5 7 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 2 1 9 6 5 1 9 6 8 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 7 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 8 
VIII. Concluding Remarks
Some of the issues considered in this paper rest on the speed of adjustment of the capital stock. Large persistent movements in the stock market could be the result of the ebb and flow of rents that only dissipate at a 10 percent rate each Although the 30-year constant maturity yield would match Moodys more closely, it is available only starting in 1977. The series for yields on long-terms is the only one available for the entire period. The average maturity for the long-term series is not reported, but the series covers all outstanding government securities that are neither due nor callable in less than 10 years.
To estimate the interest rate for 10-year corporate bonds, I added the spread described above to the yield on 10-year Treasury bonds. The resulting interest rate played two roles. First, it provided the coupon rate on newly issued bonds. Second, I used it to estimate the market value of bonds issued earlier which was obtained as the present value, using the current yield, of future coupon and principal payments on the outstanding imputed bond issues.
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The stock of outstanding equity reported in the Flow of Funds Accounts is conceptually the market value of equity. In fact, the series tracks the S&P 500
closely.
All of the flow data were obtained from utabs.zip at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/data.htm. All of the interest rate data were taken from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H15/data.htm.
I measured the flow of payouts as the flow of dividends plus the interest paid on debt plus the flow of repurchases of equity less the increase in the volume of financial liabilities.
I estimated interest paid on debt as the sum of the following:
1. Coupon payments on corporate bonds and tax-exempt securities, discussed above.
2. For interest paid on commercial paper, taxes payable, trade credit, and miscellaneous liabilities, I estimated the interest rate as the 3-month commercial paper rate, which is reported starting in 1971. Before 1971, I
used the interest rate on 3-month Treasuries, plus a spread of 0.7 percent (the average spread between both rates after 1971). I estimated earnings on assets held as
